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We consider a model of the innovative environment where there is a distinction between ideas
for R&D investments and the investments themselves. We investigate the optimal reward
policy and how it depends on whether ideas are scarce or obvious. By foregoing investment
in a current idea, society as a whole preserves an option to invest in a better idea for the
same market niche, but with delay. Because successive ideas may occur to diﬀerent people,
there is a conﬂict between private and social optimality. We argue that private incentives to
create socially valuable options can be achieved by giving higher rewards where "ideas are
scarce." We then explore how rewards should be structured when the value of an innovation
comes from its applications, and ideas for the innovation may be more or less scarce than
ideas for the applications.
JEL Classiﬁcations: O34, K00, L00
Keywords: Ideas; patents; intellectual property, innovation; options; nonobviousness1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Patent law doctrine distinguishes innovations that deserve a patent from those that do not
according to the standards of novelty and nonobviousness. These doctrines feed a litigation
industry since it is hard to know what they mean, even in light of considerable case law,
and even harder to know what they should mean, when considered from the perspective of
optimal incentives. In this paper we study a new model in which “nonobvious” has a clear
meaning, linked to an exogenous parameter of the innovative environment. We illuminate
optimal reward schemes as they depend on nonobviousness.
Most economic models of the R&D environment begin with some sort of production
function for knowledge, which says how the investment of resources will accelerate innova-
tion, increase the probability that innovation happens, or otherwise lead to the invention
of new products or cost reductions. It is usually assumed that the production function is
common knowledge.
The production-function model of innovation is hard to square with legal doctrine. In
what sense is an innovation “nonobvious” if everyone knows how to achieve it? Legal
doctrine has disparaged mere “sweat of the brow” (cost) as a standard for patentability,
preferring some loftier ideal that involves creativity or imagination. It is hard to ﬁnd
creativity or imagination in the production function for knowledge.
The model in this paper tries to bridge the gap. As in O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and
Thisse (1998), we distinguish between ideas and innovations. To innovate, the inventor
must ﬁrst have an idea, which we interpret as an act of imagination, and then have an
incentive to invest in it. The notion is that “ideas” for innovations occur exogenously,
perhaps inﬂuenced by the social institutions in which potential innovators interact, but
that an idea is lost unless the recipient invests. The twist in this paper is that, if an idea
is rejected, the market niche may nevertheless be ﬁlled by someone else who comes along
later with a substitute idea that is even better.
We distinguish between obvious and nonobvious ideas on the basis of the frequency with
which substitute ideas occur to the population of innovators as a whole. We say that ideas
1are scarce if substitute ideas come along rarely. In contrast, an idea would be common
knowledge i ft h es a m ei d e aw e r ea v a i l a b l et oe v e r y o n ea tt h es a m et i m e .
If all the substitute ideas were available at a given time to a given person, there would
often be no conﬂict between the private incentive to invest and the socially eﬃcient in-
vestment choice. It would be eﬃcient from both points of view to invest in the best idea.
However, because the ideas occur to random people at random times, the private decision
problem is diﬀerent from the social decision problem. The private investment decision is
simply to invest if the idea at hand will generate positive expected proﬁt. The socially
eﬃcient decision must account for the option created by not investing, namely, the option
to invest later when someone thinks of an even better idea. If substitute ideas are likely to
occur to diﬀerent people, no individual will account for this option in his own investment
decision. The problem is compounded by the fact that ideas arrive at random times.
Our main conclusion is that, to mediate the conﬂict between private and social incen-
tives, patent rewards should reﬂect the scarcity of ideas. Speciﬁcally, patent rewards should
be larger in environments where ideas are scarce than in environments where substitute
ideas are likely to turn up. The legal doctrine of nonobviousness is a natural policy lever for
distinguishing among such environments. In economic environments where better ideas for
the same market niche come along rapidly, the option created by not investing is valuable.
Since other ideas will come along quickly, the patent reward should not tempt investment
in high-cost or inferior ways to ﬁll the market niche. However, in economic environments
where ideas are scarce, there may be a large cost of delay in waiting for a better idea. The
reward system should therefore encourage investment in less good, or higher cost, ideas in
order to avoid delay.
Because there is often no record of ideas that are rejected as too costly, or of better
ideas that arrive after the market niche is ﬁlled, it is hard to track this phenomenon in
practice. However, the history of computers is suggestive. The essential concept in computer
hardware is a "switch" which can be set on or oﬀ. A switch codes bits (zeros or ones) and
many switches together can implement logic. The ﬁrst conception of a general purpose
2computer (programming, logic, and memory) was by Babbage in the early 19th century.
His idea for a switch was to use brass gears, which were expensive and had to be machined
to very high precision. Although Babbage pursued his idea as a hobby, the cost could not be
justiﬁed by the main computational challenge of the day, which was to produce astronomical
tables for navigation. One hundred years later, urgent new computational problems had
emerged — notably including tables for aiming artillery pieces — and Professor Howard
Aiken of Harvard University had a cheaper way to make switches. Shortly afterward,
there emerged a better idea for switches, namely to use electrical devices. First these were
reed switches, then vacuum tubes, then transistors, and ﬁnally, integrated circuits. Today,
switches are printed onto silicon using lithographic techniques and have become so cheap
that the world produces more transistors than grains of rice.
In section 2, we present our main model and conclusions, ﬁrst assuming that rewards can
be linked to the rate at which ideas occur, and then assuming that the rate must be inferred
from the delay in ﬁlling the market niche. The conclusions we draw about the optimal
reward structure can be applied equally well to prizes or patents. Section 3 asks whether
the possibility of keeping an innovation secret will subvert or reinforce our conclusions.
In section 4, we pay closer attention to patents as the incentive instrument. Section 4
asks whether a common set of patent instruments can be used to set optimal incentives
at two stages of innovation, where the main value of the ﬁrst innovation is embodied in
the applications it engenders. In line with our basic model, we assume that ideas for the
innovation may be more or less scarce than ideas for the applications. In section 5, we discuss
the implications of our ﬁndings for the various policy levers of patent law, including the
nonobviousness standard, and how our ﬁndings relate to previous treatments of patentability
in the literature.
32 Scarce ideas and optimal rewards
2.1 Model
There is market niche that may be ﬁlled with an innovation. There is an exogenous process
by which the potential innovators receive ideas for ﬁlling this market niche. Each idea
occurs at a random time, to a random recipient. Successive ideas for the given market niche
are imperfect substitutes and may require diﬀerent R&D costs. We use v for the ﬂow value
of having ﬁlled the market niche.
Each idea has associated to it an R&D cost that is drawn independently from a common
distribution F with support in [0,∞) and density f. To create an innovation, the recipient
of an idea must invest the cost. We assume that the ideas rain down on the population
according to a Poisson process with parameter λ, and we take the parameter λ as a measure
of scarcity. If the hit rate λ is low, ideas are scarce.
If the recipient of an idea discards it, it is not available to anyone else. If the recipient
of an idea invests in it, the process stops because the market niche has been ﬁlled.
The optimal policy will therefore operate by getting the population of potential innova-
tors to screen their ideas and discard those with costs that are too high. The social option
created by not investing in a given idea is that another idea might entail a lower cost. There
is thus a social trade-oﬀ between cost and delay. The policy objective is to manage this
trade-oﬀ in a way that is socially optimal.
The option for lower cost that is preserved by discarding an idea is a social option, but
not a private option for the recipient. We assume that each agent receives at most one idea.
This is an intentionally extreme assumption that highlights the main premise of the paper.
Ideas are scarce, not only for society as a whole, but especially from the perspective of any
individual.
The social policy is described by a threshold function c : R+ → R+ such that the
recipient of an idea at time t invests if the cost of the idea is less than c(t).A t h r e s h o l d
function is stationary if there exists ¯ c in R+ such that c(t)=¯ c for all arrival times t.W e
s a ya ni d e aa tt i m et is viable if it has cost less than c(t). The arrival rate of viable ideas at
4time t is λF (c(t)). The investment process ends when the ﬁrst viable idea arrives because
the market niche is then ﬁlled.
The optimal threshold function will involve a trade-oﬀ between ﬁlling the market niche
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(Snyder and Miller, 1991, p. 51). As seen from time t, the probability that the ﬁrst viable
idea arrives at time ˆ t>tis the probability that no viable idea arrives between t and ˆ t times












2.2 Known arrival rate: Rewards increase with the scarcity of ideas
We ﬁrst assume that the Poisson arrival rate λ is known, and characterize the optimal
threshold function c, as well as optimal rewards. Our main result is that, given λ, the
optimal threshold function is stationary, and further, that the optimal stationary value
decreases with the arrival rate of ideas, λ.
Conditional on an arbitrary threshold function c, and assuming that no viable idea has























= V (t,c,λ) (3)
The left hand side is the net social value of investing in the threshold idea at time t.T h e
right hand side is the expected, discounted value of waiting for a better idea. If the left
5hand side were greater than the right hand side, then social welfare could be improved by
increasing the threshold cost. If the right hand side were greater than the left hand side,
then social welfare could be increased by decreasing the threshold cost.











Proposition 1 Suppose that the arrival rate of ideas, λ, is ﬁxed and known. Suppose that
c : R+ → R+ is the threshold function that maximizes V (0,·,λ). Then c is stationary.
This is proved in the appendix. In particular, we show that the optimized value of
V (t,c,λ) is the same at all starting times t, from which it follows, using (4), that the
optimal threshold function is stationary.
Welfare as a function of the stationary threshold ¯ c can be written as
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− EF (¯ c)
´ λF (¯ c)
λF (¯ c)+r
(5)
This expression shows the trade-oﬀ faced by the policy maker. If a higher stationary cost
threshold ¯ c is tolerated, the innovation will arrive sooner since the hit rate of viable ideas,
λF (¯ c), is then higher, and the discounting expression,
λF(¯ c)
(λF(¯ c)+r), is larger.
Since the optimal threshold function is stationary, we can conceive of the optimal pol-
icy as a value c∗ (λ) ∈ R+,w h e r ec(t)=c∗ (λ) for each t.T h eﬁrst order condition for







(λF (c∗ (λ)) + r)
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− EF (c∗ (λ))
´
=0 .( 6 )
The (unique) solution c∗ (λ) has the property that investing in the marginal innovation
today, and receiving net value
¡v
r − c∗ (λ)
¢
, is as valuable as waiting for the next viable
idea, which will occur with some delay, but may have a lower cost. If the arrival rate of
6ideas λ is larger, then the cost of waiting is reduced, and it is optimal to be more stringent in
the ideas that are accepted for investment. One can see this by diﬀerentiating (6) implicitly,
which leads to
Proposition 2 If the arrival rate of ideas, λ, is ﬁxed and known, the optimal cost threshold
is stationary, and is decreasing with the arrival rate λ; that is c∗ (·) is decreasing.
To implement the optimal threshold function, let ρ : R+ → R+ be a reward function.
The reward function ρ implements the threshold function c if ρ = c. Then the recipient
ﬁnds it proﬁtable to invest rather than discard the idea if and only if investment is optimal
according to the threshold function c. The reward function is stationary if ρ(t)=¯ ρ for
some ¯ ρ ∈ R+, and the optimal stationary reward is ρ∗ (λ)=c∗ (λ).
Proposition 3 When the hit rate of ideas is known and ﬁxed, the optimal reward function
is stationary, and the optimal stationary value ρ∗ (·) is decreasing with the arrival rate λ.
We interpret this proposition as saying that rewards should be higher when ideas are
scarce. This is true even though the distribution of costs associated with ideas remains the
same.
2.3 Unknown arrival rate: Rewards increase with delay
Like all contracts, R&D incentives must depend on things that are veriﬁa b l e .T h i si st r u e
whether the R&D incentive is provided as a prize or a patent. Although we have shown
that the size of the reward should increase with the scarcity of ideas, the Poisson hit rate
cannot be veriﬁed. At best, the prize or patent authority knows the date that the innovation
materializes, but does not observe the distribution of arrival times or the arrival of ideas
that were rejected.
In this section we investigate what the prize or patent authority should do when λ is
unknown. We assume that the prize or patent authority takes the length of time without
arrival as a signal of λ. A long delay with no arrival should make the observer more
pessimistic about λ — it shifts the posterior distribution on λ toward lower values. However,
7the posterior distribution on λ must also account for the fact that some ideas are rejected.
Thus, the investment strategy by which recipients accept or reject ideas is an ingredient to
forming a posterior belief on λ.
We showed above that, when λ is known, the minimum acceptable cost to ﬁll the market
niche is stationary. The stationary value is larger when ideas are scarce (λ is small) than
when ideas are obvious. The stationarity is essentially because the optimized value function
V is stationary, where V describes the social value of rejecting an idea and waiting for a
lower-cost idea.
We now show that, when the posterior distribution on λ is changing as time passes,
neither the optimized value function nor the optimal investment strategy is stationary. As
time passes, the posterior distribution on λ shifts toward lower values. This implies that
the (optimized) value of waiting for a better idea decreases with time. This in turn implies
that society should optimally be less discriminating about which ideas are accepted. The
socially optimal cost threshold is increasing instead of being stationary.
Let ˜ h be the prior density function for the distribution of λ with support [0,∞).T h e n
the posterior density, conditional on a threshold function c, and conditional on no viable hit





for each λ ∈ (0,∞)
The posterior depends on the threshold function c up to time t, through the value Λ(t,c).
Hence, the prior distribution ˜ h can be written h(·|0,c) for any threshold function c,s i n c e
at time 0 there is no prior history on which to condition a posterior, and Λ(0,c)=0 .





The following lemma is proved in the appendix.
Lemma 1 Given a threshold function c,i ft1 <t 2, then the distribution h(·|t1,c) stochas-
tically dominates h(·|t2,c),a n dE (λ|t2,c) <E(λ|t1,c).
8The probability that the ﬁrst viable idea arrives at ˆ t, conditional on λ and conditional


















Assuming that there has been no viable idea before t, the social value of continuing from
time t is given by the function ˜ V deﬁned below. For generality and for use in the arguments
below, we have allowed that the threshold function ˜ c that determines the posterior distri-
bution of λ can diﬀer from the threshold function c that is relevant to the value ˜ V going
forward from time t. Since ˜ c determines the posterior distribution on λ at time t, the only
relevant values are those that occur before t.























If the optimizing function c is followed at every t, the optimizing function determines
both the posterior on λ at each time t and the value V going forward. By the principle





. Then, analogously to (3) and (4) in the previous subsection, the
optimal threshold function c satisﬁes the following at each t:
v
r




˜ V (t,c,h(·|t,c)) (8)
To show that c0 (t) > 0 at t, it is enough to show that d
dt ˜ V (t,c,h(·|t,c)) < 0,w h e r ec is the
optimal threshold function. The intuitive reason that ˜ V is decreasing is that the observer
b e c o m e sm o r ea n dm o r ep e s s i m i s t i ca b o u tt h ea rrival rate of ideas as time continues without
a viable hit. Because of this pessimism, more delay is expected. To mitigate delay, it is
optimal to tolerate higher cost. That is why the optimal c is increasing. In the appendix
we prove the following result.
9Proposition 4 Suppose that the arrival rate of ideas, λ, has a prior distribution ˜ h with




.T h e nc is
increasing.
The reward function that implements the optimal threshold function c is again ρ = c,
from which it follows that:
Proposition 5 Suppose that the optimal threshold function is increasing with the arrival
time of the innovation. Then the optimal reward is also increasing with the arrival time.
3 Optimal rewards, secrecy and scarce ideas
So far, we have assumed that the only compensation available to an innovator is the reward.
In this section, we consider environments where it is possible to appropriate the value of
the innovation, and ask whether the optimal reward must be modiﬁed if the innovator is
tempted to keep the innovation secret while marketing it instead of claiming the reward.
The key assumption is that the proﬁt available from the secret innovation ends either when
it leaks out or when another ﬁrm gets the reward for an innovation which also ﬁlls the given
market niche. Hence, secrecy is more attractive precisely in those environments where ideas
are scarce.
We assume that the innovator cannot both get the reward and keep the innovation
secret. This is a reasonable assumption since the goal of most reward systems is to make
innovations public. Hence, if the innovator gets the reward, the innovation is disclosed.
Since secrecy creates rewards through monopoly power, we must make an assumption
about per-period proﬁt. We will assume for simplicity that the monopolist collects the
whole social value v during the period of market incumbency. This assumption allows us
to focus on the aspect of eﬃciency discussed in this paper, which concerns the trade-oﬀ
between delay and cost, without being sidetracked into a discussion of deadweight loss. We
comment at the end on how these conclusions change if monopoly power entails deadweight
loss.
10Secrecy entails social costs, even in the absence of deadweight loss. In this setup,
secrecy may cause the market niche to be ﬁlled twice — ﬁrst by the innovator who keeps
the innovation secret, and then possibly by a successor, who discloses his innovation.1
Surprisingly, we show that under the optimal reward structure derived in section 2, the ﬁrst
innovator never has incentives to keep the innovation secret, even if he can earn the entire
social value during the period of secrecy.
For simplicity, we revert to the model where λ is known and ﬁxed. We assume that
leakage occurs as a Poisson process with hit rate γ.2 The hit rate for ideas that will
displace the secret innovation is λF (ρ),w h e r eρ is the reward.3 Consequently, if the per-





1 − e−rˆ t
´
(γ + λF (ρ))e−(γ+λF(ρ))ˆ tdˆ t
=
v
γ + λF (ρ)+r
.( 9 )
The proﬁt from secrecy depends on the reward ρ because the reward determines the delay
before a disclosed, substitute product enters the market.
In the following proposition, we show that the innovator never prefers secrecy.
Proposition 6 Secrecy is never preferred to claiming the reward.





γ + λF (ρ∗ (λ))









γ + λF (ρ∗ (λ))





1Implicitly we make the simplifying assumption that the second comer will not keep his innovation secret,
even if the ﬁrst innovator does. This is because the duopoly proﬁt is not very lucrative relative to the reward.
2Hence, in section 2, we were assuming that γ = ∞ and leakage occurs immediately.
3Hence, we assume that if an innovation is kept secret, it does not prevent another innovator from
qualifying for the reward. In the case that the reward is given as a patent, this means that secret innovations
are not treated as prior art.
11Using (6) and
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λF (ρ∗ (λ)) + r
EF (ρ∗ (λ)) < 0
which always holds. ¤
This proposition might be something of a surprise because the result does not depend
on the magnitudes of λ and γ. F r o m( 9 ) ,w es e et h a tt h ed i r e c te ﬀect of a decrease in λ
or γ is to make secrecy more attractive at a given reward ρ. When ideas are scarce (λ is
low) or secrets are easy to keep (γ is low), secrecy may give the innovator more proﬁtt h a n
the reward, provided the reward is held ﬁxed. However, as λ decreases, the policy maker
tries to compensate for the decrease in the arrival rate of ideas by making the reward more
attractive. Hence, when rewards are chosen optimally conditional on λ, secrecy is never
preferred.4
An intuition is that, although the innovator earns the full consumption value of the
innovation during the period of secrecy, he does not earn the full social value because he
does not collect as proﬁt the expected costs that are saved by investing at present rather
than waiting. The optimal stationary reward ρ∗ (λ) grants the (larger) full social value.
The optimal stationary reward can be written as
ρ∗ (λ)=
v
λF (ρ∗ (λ)) + r
+
λF (ρ∗ (λ))
λF (ρ∗ (λ)) + r
EF (ρ∗ (λ)) (10)
The middle term is the additional consumption value of investing in the current idea rather
than waiting, which is equal to the proﬁt earned by the secret innovation when the leakage
rate is zero (γ =0 ). (This is the most favorable circumstance for the secret innovation.)
The last term of (10) is the expected discounted cost of the next viable idea. By investing
now, society gets the interim social value (the middle term) and avoids the costs of investing
later. Thus, the optimal reward ρ∗ (λ) is the sum of both terms, and it is larger than the
proﬁt available from secrecy, ρS (ρ∗ (λ),λ,γ), which is only the middle term.
4This result is in contrast with that of Erkal (2005) who shows that it would be optimal to have a lenient
antitrust policy in industries where secrecy is an attractive option.
12If market power imposes deadweight loss, the conclusions so far are strengthened. There
is even less incentive to keep the innovation secret, and from a social point of view, secrecy
is even less desirable. This does not depend on whether the reward ρ is given as a prize or
a patent.
4 Balancing the rewards to basic innovations and applica-
tions
So far, we have argued in the context of a single innovation that the reward to innovation
should increase with the scarcity of ideas when λ is known, and with delay when λ is
unknown. We have assumed that the innovation has a ﬁxed social value, v, per unit time
and asked how to incite optimal screening of ideas in a way that balances delay against
cost.
However, where innovation is cumulative, the social value of the innovation derives from
the social welfare of applications. The value created by an innovation depends on future
ideas to put the innovation to use. For example, the laser, which was patented in the 1950’s
and has no commercial value itself, has many applications with commercial value, such as
laser surgery.
Ideas for applications may be scarce or obvious themselves. The innovation policy must
then use a common set of policy levers to elicit investments at two stages. In the previous
sections, there was no suggestion that the reward is given as a patent. In fact, the easiest
interpretation is that the reward is a prize. In this section, we have in mind that the reward
is given as a patent.
Since the patent treatments of the two innovations are intertwined, one of the questions
is whether the ﬁrst best can be achieved with the policy levers available. Suppose, in
particular, that ideas for the ﬁrst innovation are scarce (the arrival rate is low). Then,
according to our conclusion in section 2, the reward to the ﬁrst innovator should be high.
However, since the reward is bounded by the value of the application, it might not be possible
to give a high enough reward to the ﬁrst innovator while also rewarding the application
13developer.
The balancing of incentives between the two generations has features in common with
other models of sequential innovation, but also diﬀerences. First, since both innovators
share a common pot of money — the value of the applications — infringement is a key
requirement for proper incentives. Without a claim on the proﬁt generated by applications,
the ﬁrst innovator would not invest and the applications might never materialize (or might
materialize with long delay) (Scotchmer, 1991). Second, there is a question of how to divide
the proﬁt generated by the application, as well as a question of how much total proﬁt
to create (Green and Scotchmer, 1995). Third, proﬁt can be protected either because the
application has a patent or because the application infringes a prior patent (Scotchmer, 1996;
Denicolo, 2000). If both hold, the innovators must divide the proﬁt. The diﬃculty added
in our model is that ideas for applications occur at random times, leading to randomness
in the periods of protection and infringement. Rewards for applications may therefore be
random. This may cause ineﬃciencies.
We ﬁrst characterize the ineﬃciencies that may arise in the case of a single application,
and then investigate the extent to which they may be remedied when there are many
potential applications.
4.1 Single application
The parameter λ is the Poisson hit rate of ideas for the underlying innovation and δ is the
Poisson hit rate of ideas for the application. We assume that the substitute ideas for the
application have costs drawn independently from a common distribution G with density g.
As before, we ﬁrst consider the optimal investment strategy. We then ask whether the
optimal investment strategy can be implemented in a patent regime. If the hit rates λ and δ
are ﬁxed and known, the optimal investment strategies are stationary, as derived in Propo-
sition 1. There exist stationary threshold values, c∗
A (δ) and c∗
B (λ,δ), which maximize social
welfare, where the subscripts A and B refer to the application and the basic innovation.





















A (δ);δ) − EF (c)) (12)
We will assume throughout that the per-period value v of the application is ﬁxed.
Proposition 7 [Social Optimum] Suppose that the innovation creates value only through an
application with per-period social value v. Suppose that substitute ideas for the innovation
occur at Poisson rate λ, with costs drawn independently from a distribution F, and that
substitute ideas for the application occur at Poisson rate δ, with costs drawn independently
from a distribution G. Then
(a) The optimal stationary cost thresholds (c∗
A (δ),c ∗






































A (δ);δ) − EF (c∗
B (λ,δ)))
(14)
(b) The optimal cost threshold c∗
A (δ) decreases with δ, and the optimal cost threshold
c∗
B (λ,δ) decreases with λ.
(c) The optimal cost threshold c∗
B (λ,δ) increases with δ.
Proof: (a) The functions VA (c;δ) and VB (c;λ,δ) are strictly quasiconcave. These
characterizations follow from the ﬁrst order conditions ∂
∂cVA (c;δ)=0 , evaluated at c =
c∗
A (δ),a n d ∂
∂cVB (c;λ,δ)=0 , evaluated at c = c∗
B (λ,δ).
(b) As in section 2, this follows from diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order conditions, (13) and
(14).
15(c) The optimizer c∗
B (λ,β) of (12) increases with the value VA (c∗
A (δ),δ).I ti se a s yt o
see from (11) that the optimized value VA (c∗
A (δ),δ) is increasing with δ even though the
cost threshold c∗
A (δ) is decreasing with δ. ¤
The only news in Proposition 7 is that, if the hit rate δ for the application is high, then
the optimal cost threshold for the basic innovation is also high, even though the optimal
cost threshold for the application is low.
The optimum can clearly be implemented by prizes that depend on the hit rates, namely
ρA (δ)=c∗
A (δ) and ρB (λ,δ)=c∗
B (λ,δ). We now turn to whether the optimal investment
strategies can be implemented with patent instruments, in particular, diﬀerent patent lives
for the two innovations, and how that should depend on the scarcity of ideas at both stages.
We model the patent instruments in a ﬂe x i b l ew a ya sf u n c t i o n so ft h ea r r i v a ld a t eo f
the application. This more general modelling approach is convenient because we are not
conﬁned to constant patent lives. In fact, our ﬁrst result is that if the patent lives for the
two innovations are constant, it is not possible to implement the eﬃcient cost thresholds.
We therefore investigate whether it is possible to implement the eﬃc i e n tc o s tt h r e s h o l d s
with the more ﬂexible patent instruments. We show that even with such instruments, it
may not be possible to implement the optimal cost thresholds. We comment in section 5
on how other levers of patent law might be used instead.
The ﬂexible patent instruments are two patent-life functions (TB,T A),w i t hv a l u e s
TB (t) ≥ t and TA (t) ≥ 0,w h e r et is the arrival date of the application, measured from the
date of the basic innovation. A value TB (t) >texpresses the notion that the application
infringes for the length of time TB (t)−t after the application arrives. The easiest interpre-
tation is that the patent on the basic innovation ends at TB (t). Another interpretation is
that the patent runs forever, and TB (t) is the date at which infringement ends. The value
TB (t)=t expresses the notion that the patent has expired when the application arrives, so
there is no period of infringement. TA (t) is the patent life of the application.
If an application developer has an idea at time t, the expected revenue from developing



































period of total 
protection
Figure 1: Patent-life functions
application is shared as (β,1 − β) during the period of infringement, where β ∈ (0,1).( T h i s
is an exogenous assumption about relative bargaining power in achieving a license.) The
revenue earned by the application depends on the arrival time t because both the length of
infringement TB (t) − t and the application patent life TA (t) may depend on t.
Proﬁt is collected for a length of time that is the maximum of TB (t) − t and TA (t).
Figure 1 represents the two possible cases. In the ﬁrst case, TA (t) ≤ TB (t) − t. The total
period of protection is determined by the length of the patent on the basic innovation. The
application developer pays a licensing fee to the ﬁrst innovator until the application patent
expires. This is reﬂected in the ﬁrst line in the deﬁnition of ΠA, given in (15). The ﬁrst
innovator continues to earn the ﬂow value v of the application until the patent on the ﬁrst
innovation expires even if the patent on the application has expired. In the second case,
TA (t) >T B (t)−t. The total period of protection is determined by the length of the patent
on the application while the period of infringement is determined by TB (t) − t.A ss h o w n
in the second line in the deﬁnition of ΠA, during this period, the application developer and
17ﬁrst innovator share the returns from the application. After this period, the application
developer keeps all the proﬁts.
Given the patent-life functions (TB,T A), it is useful to partition arrival times into two
sets, T ∪ ¯ T =( 0 ,∞). At arrival times t ∈ T , total proﬁt is determined by the patent on
the application. At arrival times t ∈ ¯ T , total proﬁt is determined by the patent on the basic
innovation.
TA (t) ≤ TB (t) − t for each t ∈ ¯ T
TA (t) >T B (t) − t for each t ∈ T .
ΠA (t;TB,T A) (15)
=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩





TA (t) ≤ TB (t) − t










TA (t) >T B (t) − t
(or t ∈ T )
The application is developed by the ﬁrst person with an idea that would make non-
negative proﬁt, namely, the ﬁrst time t at which someone has an idea with cost less than
ΠA (t;TB,T A).






































The basic innovation is developed by the ﬁrst person whose idea has cost less than ΠB (TB,T A).
Hence, given (TB,T A), the function ΠA (·;TB,T A) is a threshold cost function for in-
vesting in the application and ΠB (TB,T A) is a stationary threshold cost for investing in
18the basic innovation. We say that the patent-life functions (TB,T A) implement (cB,c A)
if ΠB (TB,T A)=cB and ΠA (t;TB,T A)=cA for each t. We say that the stationary cost
thresholds (cB,c A) are implementable if they are in the following set:
C = {(cB,c A):there exist patent life functions (TB,T A) that implement (cB,c A)}
The most realistic restriction to put on the patent policy is that the patent lives are
constant. We say the patent life functions (TB,T A) are constant if for some ¯ TB ∈ R+ and
¯ TA ∈ R+, the functions TB,T A satisfy TA (t)=¯ TA for all t and TB (t)=¯ TB for t ≤ ¯ TB and
TB (t)=t for t>¯ TB.
We point out in Proposition 8 that constant patent lives cannot implement a stationary
cost threshold for the application. This is because the function ΠA (·,T B,T A) induces dif-
ferent cost thresholds at diﬀerent arrival times t, even when the patent lives are constant.
An application with a later arrival date faces a shorter period of infringement and gets more
of the proﬁt generated by its own patent.
Proposition 8 [Constant patent lives] Suppose that the value of the innovation resides in
an application with per-period value v. Assume that the application infringes the prior in-
novation’s patent during its patent life. There are no constant patent life functions (TB,T A)
that implement stationary cost thresholds.
When the arrival rates are ﬁxed and known, by Proposition 7 the eﬃcient cost thresholds
are stationary. Thus, constant patent lives cannot implement eﬃcient outcomes.5 Of course,
we would not generally expect patent mechanisms to implement eﬃcient outcomes due to
deadweight loss. However, deadweight loss is not the source of the ineﬃciency here since
we have assumed that patentholders earn the full value of the innovation during the patent
life. The source of the ineﬃciency is that the incentive to invest in the application depends
5This proposition shows that the economic conclusions are diﬀerent in our environment where ideas are
scarce than in environments where ideas are common knowledge. Koo and Wright (2007) also study a model
of applications with constant patent lives, and assume that the potential application developers know at the
date of the ﬁrst innovation how to achieve the application. Hence, ineﬃciencies may arise in their model,
not because ideas for applications arrive at random times, but rather because market structure may result
in delay or competitive rent dissipation.
19on when the idea occurs. The recipient of a great idea may invest if it occurs late, but
may not invest earlier, due to the large licensing fees he would then owe to the prior patent
holder.6
Even though constant patent lives will not implement stationary cost thresholds, it can
be seen from (15) and (16) that other patent life functions (TB,T A) will do so. Lemma 2,
proved in the appendix, says that all patent life functions (TB,T A) that implement given
stationary thresholds (cB,c A) are equivalent to patent life functions for which the period
TB (t) − t is constant and the patent life for the application is constant (but the patent
life for the basic innovation is not constant). In Lemma 2, the constant k is the period of
infringement.
Lemma 2 [Patent lives that implement stationary cost thresholds] Suppose that the in-
novation gets value only through an application with per-period value v and that (cB,c A)
are stationary cost thresholds implemented by
³
˜ TB, ˜ TA
´
. Then there exist (TA,T B) that
also implement (cB,c A) and satisfy the following for some k ∈ R+, ¯ TA ∈ R+ and every
t ∈ (0,∞):
TB (t) − t = k (17)
TA (t)=¯ TA
However, it is still not obvious whether there exist (TB,T A) which implement the eﬃcient
stationary thresholds. Proposition 9, proved in the appendix, characterizes the limits on
proﬁt sharing, even with the very ﬂexible patent instruments we consider. It focuses on
stationary thresholds (cB,c A) since stationarity is eﬃcient.
Proposition 9 [Implementing the optimum with a single application] Suppose that an
innovation gets its value through an application with per-period value v. Suppose that sub-
stitute ideas for an application occur at Poisson rate δ, with costs drawn independently from
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Figure 2: Implementable cost thresholds
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¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
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Figure 2 shows the set (18) of implementable stationary thresholds. The boundary
shows what is implementable when the two ﬁrms together collect the maximum possible
proﬁt, v
r.7 An increase in cA has two opposite eﬀects on the values of cB that can be
implemented. First, since an increase in cA brings forward the expected arrival time of the
application, it increases the expected discounted proﬁto ft h eﬁrst innovator. This is why
the boundary on the left side of Figure 2 (cA < (1 − β) v
r) is increasing. The points on
the left side of the boundary are determined by setting TB (t) − t = ∞ for each t,a n d
letting the constant value ¯ TA (t) range from ∞ to 0.W h e n cA is low, the maximum cB
which can be implemented is low because the innovator’s reward, which comes from the
application, is much delayed. The other eﬀect arises because the ﬁrms are sharing a ﬁxed
7Although the upper limit on cB is drawn in Figure 2 as a single-peaked function, this does not necessarily
hold.
21total payoﬀ, which is the private value of the application. When the payoﬀ to one ﬁrm
increases, the payoﬀ to the other decreases. This is why the boundary on the right side
of Figure 2 (cA > (1 − β) v
r) is decreasing. The points on this part of the boundary are
determined by setting ¯ TA = ∞ and letting the constant value k = TB (t) − t range from ∞
to 0.
A ﬁrst look at Figure 2 suggests that there will be problems in implementing the eﬃcient
cost thresholds when innovation ideas are scarce but application ideas are frequent (λ is low
but δ is high). The optimal c∗
B (λ,δ) is then high and the optimal c∗
A (δ) is low. Problems
also seem likely in environments where both innovation and application ideas are scarce (λ
and δ a r el o w ) ,s i n c et h eo p t i m a lc∗
B (λ,δ) and c∗
A (δ) are both high. However, the boundary
in Figure 2 shifts as δ changes. The following proposition, proved in the appendix, states
that, for any ﬁxed λ, the eﬃcient thresholds (c∗
B (λ,δ),c ∗
A (δ)) lie within the set in Figure
2a sδ →∞and δ → 0.A s δ →∞ , the optimal reward to the application converges to
zero, so all the social value can be given to the ﬁrst innovator. As δ → 0, the value of the
application becomes zero, so it is not optimal to support the basic innovation.
Nevertheless, eﬃciency may not always be achievable. We show this by considering what
happens as λ → 0,w i t hδ ﬁxed. For low λ,e ﬃcient incentives require a high reward for the
ﬁrst innovator. This may be inconsistent with giving adequate reward to the application
developer.
Proposition 10 Let (c∗
B (λ,δ),c ∗
A (δ)) stand for the eﬃcient stationary cost thresholds. (i)
For given λ ∈ (0,∞),a sδ →∞and as δ → 0, (c∗
B (λ,δ),c ∗
A (δ)) are implementable. (ii)
For given δ ∈ (0,∞),a sλ → 0, (c∗
B (λ,δ),c ∗
A (δ)) are not implementable.
4.2 Multiple applications
We now ask whether the problem of ineﬃciency stated in Proposition 10 is mitigated when
there are n applications rather than one. On one hand, if there are n applications, each
application developer only pays 1/n of the innovator’s total reward. Thus, even if ideas
for each application are frequent, so they optimally receive low rewards, the ﬁrst innovator
22might be highly rewarded because he collects licensing fees from many applications. On the
other hand, the social value of the innovation increases proportionately with the number of
applications. Delay in achieving the ﬁrst innovation becomes more costly, which calls for a
higher reward. This may restore the conﬂict.
We investigate which of these intuitions dominates. Proposition 11 shows a sense in
which, with many applications, the constraint described in Proposition 10(ii) will not bind
very severely as n becomes large, regardless of how low the reward to applications is.
If there are n applications, each with the same arrival rate of ideas δ, the same per-period
social value v, and the same distribution of costs, the optimized value of the applications
is nVA (c∗
A (δ);δ) instead of VA (c∗
A (δ);δ). Analogously to (14), the optimal investment
threshold for the basic innovation, c∗






























Since the value of the innovation is n times its value with one application, there is more social
cost to delaying the innovation, and the innovation should be more highly rewarded. It is
easy to see from (19) that c∗






n →∞ . That is, with high probability, the ﬁrst idea for the innovation should be accepted.







be implemented. Given (TA,T B), the ﬁrst innovator’s proﬁt scales with the number of
applications. Namely, it is nΠB (TB,T A). Hence, the equilibrium cost threshold for the
underlying innovation also scales with the number of applications. With one application,
t h ec o s tt h r e s h o l di sΠB (TA,T B).W i t hn applications, the cost threshold is nΠB (TA,T B).
Proposition 11 shows that with many applications, the optimal stationary cost thresh-
olds can be implemented if the support of F is bounded. Even if the applications receive
a low reward, the ﬁrst innovation’s reward will be high enough so that every cost from the
bounded support is accepted. The diﬃculty in sharing proﬁtv a n i s h e s .
This is not true if the support of F is unbounded. The ﬁrst idea that arrives may have
23such high cost that it exceeds the proﬁt available to the ﬁrst innovator from licensing n
applications. However, as n grows, the probability that this happens becomes lower and
lower. The tails of the distribution F have only small probability if the mean of F is ﬁnite.
Therefore, the probability of discarding the ﬁrst idea goes to zero. In expectation, the delay
in achieving the ﬁrst innovation also goes to zero.
Proposition 11 [Implementing the optimum with many applications] Suppose that an in-
novation gets its value through n applications, each with per-period value v. Suppose that
substitute ideas for the innovation occur at Poisson rate λ, with costs drawn independently
from a distribution F, and that substitute ideas for each application occur at Poisson rate
δ, with costs drawn independently from a distribution G.








(b) If the support of F is [0,∞), there exist a sequence of implementable stationary cost












as n →∞ .
Proof: With n applications, the following describes the thresholds (cB,n,c A) that can
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B,n(λ,δ) ≤ ¯ c, it holds that
c∗
B,n(λ,δ)
n → 0 as n →∞ . Hence, since cA < v
r,i t






is implementable for suﬃciently large n.
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are implementable. Suppose instead that c∗
B,n(λ,δ) > ¯ cB,n for some large n. It follows
from (19) and the fact that nVA (c∗
A (δ);δ) →∞as n →∞that c∗
B,n(λ,δ) →∞as



































24Proposition 11 can be interpreted to mean that any conﬂict in rewarding the two gen-
erations of innovators almost vanishes when there are many applications. Even if each
application generates low revenue, the revenue earned by the ﬁrst innovation can be high
since the innovator receives licensing fees from each application.
5 Economic Concepts and Legal Concepts
There are two sets of arguments in this paper. One set of arguments is about the optimal size
of rewards. The other is about how the rewards should be structured when two generations
of innovations are at stake.
We have argued that rewards (whether prizes or patents) should be higher in environ-
ments where ideas are scarce. If ideas are scarce, higher cost should be tolerated in order
to reduce delay. The same principle applies in the context of basic and applied research. If
rewards can be given separately for the two generations of innovations, then in each case,
the optimal reward depends on the scarcity of ideas for achieving it.
In the context of basic and applied research, there are two reasons that ﬁrst-best in-
vestment incentives might not be achievable with intellectual property.8 The ﬁrst is that
there is a natural problem of budget balance. Both generations of innovators must be re-
warded from the same pot of money, which is the value of the intellectual property right
on the applications. The second is that there is a problem of how to divide proﬁt. Even if
applications provide enough revenue to reward both innovators optimally, the intellectual
property regime restricts how it can be divided (see Figure 2).
This paper has illuminated a new subtlety in the problem of dividing proﬁt. Because
ideas for applications arrive at random times, diﬀerent applications may face diﬀerent pe-
riods of infringement, and thus receive diﬀerent rewards. For this reason, a patent system
with constant patent lives cannot generally create optimal incentives. What matters for
incentives are the period of infringement and the patent life on the applications, but not
otherwise the length of the patent on the basic innovation.
8These also show up in other models of basic and applied research, e.g., Green and Scotchmer (1995),
Scotchmer (1996) and Denicolo (2000), and other papers referenced in chapter 5 of Scotchmer (2004).
25We now ask whether patent law has levers that can achieve our economic prescrip-
tions. The main requirements for obtaining a patent are novelty, nonobviousness, utility
and enablement. Nonobviousness governs the breadth of claims that are granted. When the
statutory patent life is the same for all patentable innovations, breadth is the main lever
to diﬀerentiate rewards. Our main prescription is that, when ideas are scarce, the nonobvi-
ousness requirement should be interpreted to grant generous claims, or broad patents.
In our model, a broad patent on a basic innovation is interpreted as a long period of
collecting license fees from applications developers. There is probably no policy lever to ﬁne-
tune the period of infringement, but the same eﬀect can be achieved by creating uncertainty
as to whether applications infringe, and providing for a higher probability of infringement
when ideas for the basic innovation are scarce. However it is achieved, a broad patent on
the basic innovation impinges on the proﬁt of applications developers. This demonstrates
the basic conﬂict that arises when both innovators must be rewarded from the same pot
of money. The proﬁt of the applications developers might be restored by lengthening or
broadening their own patents, but there is no provision in patent law that allows courts or
the PTO to adjust patents according to duties owed to previous patent holders.
Despite these limitations in patent law, there is one redeeming feature that we have
not yet mentioned. In our discussion of applications, we made the simplifying assumption
that ideas for every application arrive at the same rate δ, and therefore all applications
require the same reward. Suppose, however, that ideas for diﬀerent applications arrive at
diﬀerent rates and the time of arrival is a signal of the arrival rate. Then, as in section 2.3,
patent rewards should increase with the time of arrival. Rewards will automatically have
this feature if the patent lives of both the basic innovation and applications are constant.
Applications that arrive later will receive a higher reward because they face a shorter period
of infringement and smaller licensing fees.
We close this section by comparing our interpretation of nonobviousness to others pro-
posed by economists. Previous models which try to link economic concepts to novelty and
nonobviousness focus either on the amount of progress that is required for a patent (Scotch-
26mer and Green, 1990; O’Donoghue, 1998; Hunt, 2004), or the amount of progress that is
required to escape infringement (O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998). Our own no-
tion of nonobviousness is not deﬁned by increments to progress, but rather by scarcity of
ideas for investment in the ﬁrst instance.9
Our new interpretation is rooted in a diﬀerent model of the R&D process. We interpret
ideas, and the fact that ideas are private, as a model of imagination or creativity. Ideas
have economic value because they are scarce. Because ideas are not common knowledge,
innovators make positive proﬁt in expectation. This conclusion contrasts with most “racing”
models, where opportunities to invest are common knowledge and proﬁt is dissipated by
entry. In those models, resources are scarce, but ideas are not.
Since our model of the ideas process is closely related to that of O’Donoghue, Scotchmer
and Thisse (1998), we clarify the diﬀerences. The policy variable in the earlier paper is the
quality diﬀerence between an earlier product and a later product such that the later product
does not infringe. They call this parameter “leading breadth.” Leading breadth governs the
length of time that an innovator remains the market incumbent, and also governs the per-
period proﬁt during the period of incumbency. In the environment they consider, ideas come
in diﬀerent “sizes” (increments to quality), and leading breadth establishes the minimum
size idea that will become an innovation.
In the model of this paper, ideas are distinguished by cost rather than quality. However,
that is not the essential diﬀerence. The essential diﬀerence is that we allow the patent
treatment to depend on the arrival rate of ideas, rather than on aspects of the realized
technology, such as the increment to progress, or the cost of achieving it. Our argument
thus lends support for the patent authority’s use of “long-felt need” as a standard for
patentability and a reason to be more generous with patents.10
9Like us, legal commentators have advocated that courts consider the innovative environment in addition
to the technology under consideration. Merges (1993) advocates that the court considers the uncertainty of
success, as well as rival technologies. Barton (2003) and Duﬀy (2007) argue, in a spirit similar to this paper,
that the court should be less generous in environments with rapid turnover.
10Patent oﬃces instruct their examiners to consider long-felt need in deciding what merits a patent. See
European Patent Oﬃce (2007), Australian Patent Oﬃce (2007), and U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce
(2007).
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296A p p e n d i x
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We ﬁrst show that the optimized value of V is stationary.
Claim 1 Given t1 <t 2, let c1 :( t1,∞) → R+ be the function that maximizes V (t1,c,λ),
and let c2 :( t2,∞) → R+ be the function that maximizes V (t2,c,λ). Then V (t1,c 1,λ)=
V (t2,c 2,λ).







ˆ t + t2 − t1
¢
(21)
The function ˜ c1 is the same function as c2, except shifted to begin at t1 instead of t2.T h e n
by deﬁnition, V (t1,c 1,λ) ≥ V (t1,˜ c1,λ), and by construction, V (t1,˜ c1,λ)=V (t2,c 2,λ).
Hence, V (t1,c 1,λ) ≥ V (t2,c 2,λ).







ˆ t − t2 + t1
¢
Then by deﬁnition, V (t2,c 2,λ) ≥ V (t2,˜ c2,λ), and by construction, V (t2,˜ c2,λ)=V (t1,c 1,λ).
Hence, V (t2,c 2,λ) ≥ V (t1,c 1,λ). Together with V (t1,c 1,λ) ≥ V (t2,c 2,λ), this proves the
result. ¤
Claim 1 implies that d
dtV (t,c,λ)=0 . Using (4), this implies that c0 (t)=0at each t.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 1
We need to show that H (λ|t1,c) <H(λ|t2,c) for each λ in the interior of the support [0,∞)




h(λ|t,c)=F (c(t))h(λ|t,c)[E (λ|t,c) − λ]






E (λ|t,c) − ˆ λ
i
.B e c a u s eg is decreasing, if λ is such that


































































































Therefore, h(·|t1,c) stochastically dominates h(·|t2,c) and E (λ|t2,c) <E(λ|t1,c).
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The conclusion that c is increasing follows from (7) and (8), since we can show that ˜ V
is decreasing. For the derivative of ˜ V, we need the derivative of the conditional density











































































F (c(t))E (λ|t,c)+( r + F (c(t))E (λ|t,c)) ˜ V (t,c,h(·|t,c))






´ F (c(t))E (λ|t,c)
r + F (c(t))E (λ|t,c)
+ ˜ V (t,c,h(·|t,c))
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31where the last line follows from (7).
First, the optimizing function c cannot be “U-shaped" on any domain. If the func-
tion c is “U-shaped” on some domain, there exist t1 and t2 such that t1 <t 2,c (t1)=
c(t2), and c0 (t1) < 0 <c 0 (t2). However, this generates a contradiction. It holds that
¡v














,F(c(t1)) = F (c(t2)),
and (using Lemma 1) E (λ|t1,c) >E (λ|t2,c). Hence, using (22), d
dt ˜ V (t1,c,h(·|t1,c)) <
d
dt ˜ V (t2,c,h(·|t2,c)). Together with c0 (t1) < 0 <c 0 (t2), this contradicts (8).
Proposition 4 then follows from Claim 2 and Claim 3 below. By Claim 3, if c is the
optimal threshold function, ˜ V (t,c,h(·|t,c)) is decreasing with t on a domain (¯ t,∞).T h e r e -
fore, using (8), it also holds that c is increasing on that domain. But it then follows that
t h ee n t i r ef u n c t i o nc is nondecreasing, since c cannot be U-shaped on any domain. And, in
fact, c is increasing because the derivative (22) is not constant on any interval.




.T h e nt h e r ee x i s t s¯ t such
that the function t → e−rt¡v
r − EF (c(t))
¢
is decreasing on the domain (¯ t,∞).
P r o o fo fC l a i m2 :Because the optimal c cannot be U-shaped, it is either nonincreasing
or nondecreasing for suﬃciently large t. Further, because c is bounded above and below,
































To show that c is increasing for suﬃciently large t, we show that ˜ V is decreasing for
suﬃciently large t, when evaluated at the optimal c that satisﬁes (8).




. Then there exists a
domain (¯ t,∞) for which
˜ V (t1,c,h(·|t1,c)) > ˜ V (t2,c,h(·|t2,c)) if ¯ t ≤ t1 <t 2
32Proof of Claim 3: We will take the domain (¯ t,∞) as the domain on which e−rt¡v
r − EF (c(t))
¢
is decreasing, by Claim 2. We will show that
˜ V (t1,c,h(·|t1,c)) ≥ ˜ V (t1,˜ c,h(·|t1,c)) > ˜ V (t2,c,h(·|t2,c)) if ¯ t ≤ t1 <t 2 (23)
where ˜ c is deﬁned by ˜ c(t)=c(t) for t<t 1 and ˜ c(t)=c(t + t2 − t1) for t ≥ t1.
The ﬁrst inequality in (23) is true by the principle of optimality. Beginning from time t1,
the optimizing function is still c, as it was when optimized from the beginning. If ¯ c satisﬁes
˜ V (t1,¯ c,h(·|t1,c)) ≥ ˜ V (t1,ˆ c,h(·|t1,c)) for all threshold functions ˆ c, then ¯ c(t)=c(t) for
every t ≥ t1.
It is the second inequality in (23) that we must show. The function ˜ c in ˜ V (t1,˜ c,h(·|t1,c))
is deﬁned by the function c restricted to (t2,∞) and shifted back in time to t1.F o r a
ﬁxed λ, it would therefore hold that V (t1,˜ c,λ)=V (t2,c,λ). However, ˜ V (t1,˜ c,h(·|t1,c)) 6=
˜ V (t2,c,h(·|t2,c)) because λ is unknown, and the posterior distribution on λ is diﬀerent at t1
than at t2. In particular, using Lemma 1, h(·|t1,c) p u t sr e l a t i v e l yh i g hw e i g h to nh i g hv a l u e s
of λ, where the value V (t1,˜ c,λ) is relatively high (under the hypothesis that the integrand
e−rt¡v
r − EF (c(t))
¢
is decreasing), and h(·|t2,c) puts high weight on relatively low values of
λ, where V (t2,c,λ) is lower (under the hypothesis that the integrand e−rt¡v
r − EF (c(t))
¢
is decreasing). Thus, ˜ V (t1,˜ c,h(·|t1,c)) > ˜ V (t2,c,h(·|t2,c)).
We now show this formally.




































































h(λ|t2,c)V (t2,c,λ)dλ = ˜ V (t2,c,h) (24)
33Since e−r(t−t2) ¡v
r − EF (c(t))
¢
is decreasing with t for t ∈ (¯ t,∞),V(t2,c,·) increases with
λ. Then (24) follows because the distribution h(·|t1,c) stochastically dominates h(·|t2,c).
This means that h(·|t2,c) puts relatively more weight on low values of λ, where the value
of V (t2,c,λ) is low, and h(·|t1,c) puts relatively more weight on high values of λ,w h e r e
the value of V (t2,c,λ) is high. ¤
6.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Let c be the threshold function with stationary value cA.L e tˆ TA ∈ R+ be deﬁned by








˜ TB, ˜ TA
´
implement the stationary thresholds (cB,c A), arrival times can be parti-
tioned into T ∪ ¯ T =( 0 ,∞) such that
˜ TA (t) ≤ ˜ TB (t) − t and ˜ TA (t)=ˆ TA for each t ∈ ¯ T
˜ TA (t) > ˜ TB (t) − t for each t ∈ T

























1 − e−r( ˜ TB(t)−t)
´
δG(cA)e−(δG(cA)+r)tdt
There are two cases.








1 − e−r ˆ TA
´
δG(cA)e−(δG(cA)+r)tdt



































1 − e−r ˆ TA
´
δG(cA)e−(δG(cA)+r)tdt















e−r ¯ TA − e−rk
´i
δG(cA)e−(δG(cA)+r)tdt
In each case, deﬁne the function TA by TA (t)=¯ TA, and deﬁne the function TB by TB (t)=
k + t. Then the pair (TB,T A) satisﬁes (17) and implements (cB,c A).
6.5 Proof of Proposition 9
We must show that (cB,c A) is in the set (18) if and only if (cB,c A) ∈ C.W eﬁrst assume
that (cB,c A) is in the set (18) and show that (cB,c A) ∈ C.L e t(cB,c A) be an arbitrary
element of (18). Then, using Lemma 2, (cB,c A) ∈ C if it can be implemented by (TB,T A)
deﬁned as TB (t)=k+t for some k ∈ (0,∞) and TA (t)=¯ TA for some ¯ TA ≥ 0. Thus, using
cA = ΠA (t;TB,T A) for each t and cB = ΠB (TB,T A), the pair (cB,c A) can be implemented
if it holds for some k ≥ 0, ¯ TA ≥ 0 that




1 − e−r ¯ TA
´











e−r ¯ TA − e−rk
´¸
























if k ≤ ¯ TA (28)
which also imply that
cB =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




















if k ≤ ¯ TA
(29)




























































If (cB,c A) ∈ C1, the pair (cB,c A) can be implemented by choosing ¯ TA such that (25)













. Thus, every pair in C1 can be implemented.
If (cB,c A) ∈ C2 ∪ C3,t h ep a i r(cB,c A) can be implemented by k such that (28) holds,










δG(cA) cB.T h u s ,e v e r yp a i ri nC2 and C3 can be implemented.
We now show that if (cB,c A) ∈ C,t h e n(cB,c A)is in the set deﬁn e db y( 1 8 ) . U s i n g
Lemma 2, we show the converse instead: If (cB,c A) is not in the set (18), then (cB,c A)
cannot be implemented by any (TB,T A) deﬁned by k ∈ R+ and ¯ TA ∈ R+.G i v e ncA > v
r












, it follows from (29) that the pair (cB,c A) cannot
be implemented.
6.6 Proof of Proposition 10
Since VA (c;δ) and VB (c;λ,δ) are strictly quasiconcave functions of c, the solutions that
satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions (13) and (14) are unique, namely, (c∗
B (λ,δ),c ∗
A (δ)).








since it holds that c∗
A (δ) → 0 and EG (c∗
A (δ)) → 0 as δ →∞ .
From Proposition 9, the set C of implementable stationary thresholds is deﬁned by (18).









36As δ →∞ , cB (cA) → v
r for each cA. (The boundary of Figure 2 converges to a line at
height v
r.) Since the eﬃcient c∗
B (λ,δ) cannot be larger than the gross social value created,
v
r,t h ee ﬃcient cost thresholds are implementable.
Now consider δ → 0, which implies VA (c∗
A (δ);δ) → 0. Since the ﬁrst derivative of
VB (c;λ,δ) with respect to c would be negative for any positive value of c, c∗
B (λ,δ) → 0.












A (δ);δ) − EF (c))
¶
.































































A (δ);δ) − EF (cB))
#
.
The bracketed term is positive as λ → 0, and therefore (using quasiconcavity of VB (c;λ,δ))
positive for all c ≤ ¯ cB (c∗
A (δ)). Hence, the eﬃcient c∗
B (λ,δ) will be higher than cB (c∗
A (δ))
as λ → 0.
37